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ABSTRACT
Blackburn has put forward a very influential argument against moral realism, which turns 
around the supervenience relation. Dreier’s version of the supervenience argument has a 
narrower target. It should be effective against non-reductive, robust moral realism, by re-
vealing an explanatory cost that non-robust, naturalistic forms of moral realism do not have. 
The present paper argues that naturalist realism can explain the necessity involved in the 
supervenience relation only by assuming an unrestricted application of Boolean closure 
principles. Pending an independent argument to the effect that even an indefinite and per-
haps infinite combination of natural properties is itself a natural property, robust realists are 
entitled to reject Dreier’s attempt to build the Boolean closure clause into the very formu-
lation of strong supervenience. The conclusion is that moral naturalists cannot claim a clear 
advantage over robust realists with regard to the challenge posed by the supervenience 
argument. A final section makes some remarks on how moral expressivism could answer the 
supervenience argument.
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I
Notoriously, Simon Blackburn (1984, 1985) has put forward a very influential argument 
against moral realism, which turns around the supervenience relation. James Dreier’s version of 
the supervenience argument (Dreier, 1992, 2015, n.d.) draws on Blackburn’s original version, but 
has a narrower target. While Blackburn aims to show that the supervenience of the moral on the 
natural poses a problem for all brands of moral realism, thereby supporting moral antirealism, 
Dreier claims that the supervenience argument is effective only against non-reductive moral re-
alism. In Dreier’s view, the supervenience argument reveals an explanatory cost of what he calls 
“robust realism”, a cost that naturalistic forms of moral realism do not have. (They may have 
other costs and at the end of the day be in a worse position than non-reductive realism, but this 
is beyond the grasp of the supervenience argument.)
At least in part, this difference is due to the fact that Blackburn makes use of a relatively 
vague notion of the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm, whereas Dreier has in 
mind a much more precise formulation of what the supervenience relation is. Dreier’s preferred 
formulation is based on Jaegwon Kim’s formula of Strong Supervenience of mental properties on 
physical properties (cf. Kim, 1984). It is the following:
SS: ‪
a
(∀F in α)(∀x)[Fx → (∃G in β)[Gx & ‪
m
(∀y)[Gy → Fy]]]
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α is the set of moral properties and β is the set of natural, 
“descriptive” properties. SS then says that whenever a moral 
property F is instantiated, then necessarily a natural property 
G is instantiated, which in turn necessarily determines the in-
stantiation of F. Although this is strictly no part of SS, Dreier 
takes each of the sets α and β as closed under Boolean oper-
ations. That is to say: if F and F´ are both moral properties, 
so are the combined properties of being both F and F´, being 
either F or F´, not being F, and so forth. This applies also to 
any natural properties G and G´: arbitrary combinations of 
these properties with the connectives of propositional logic 
are eo ipso natural properties.
It is not clear why Dreier assumes Boolean closure in the 
general explanation of the strong supervenience of the moral 
on the natural. Dreier (1992, p. 23) asserts, without going into 
much detail, that the analysis of supervenience claims requires 
Boolean closure of the relevant sets of properties. This would 
be no problem if we had only non-naturalist moral realism 
in view. For non-naturalist moral realism is the claim that 
the set of moral properties, on the one hand, and the set of 
natural properties, on the other hand, are entirely disjoint. 
Dreier recognizes that the Boolean closure condition may be 
problematic in the context of naturalism, “for many natural-
ists maintain that a class of properties closed under Boolean 
combination and containing no moral properties would have 
to be very sparse indeed” (Dreier, 2015, p. 5). Anyway, he im-
poses the closure condition and tries to evade the problem by 
setting the focus on non-naturalism.
However, as we will see, he cannot now get the intend-
ed result that robust realism is not able to explain SS, while 
naturalist realism is. Even if it is true that robust realism has 
a cost regarding the explanation of SS, naturalist realism can 
arguably explain SS only by assuming unrestricted applica-
tion of Boolean closure principles. Pending an independent 
argument to the effect that even an indefinite and perhaps 
infinite combination of natural properties is itself a natural 
property, robust realists are entitled to reject Dreier’s attempt 
to build the Boolean closure clause into the very formulation 
of strong supervenience. If it is reformulated along these lines, 
the supervenience argument leads to an impasse: neither ro-
bust realists nor moral naturalists can (as of yet) discharge the 
burden of explaining the strong supervenience of the moral 
on the natural. The next sections will get into the details of 
why this is so.
II
If true at all, SS is an analytical, conceptual truth. The 
outer box expresses analytical necessity. If it stands in need 
of an explanation, SS, as any other conceptual truth, re-
quires an analytical, conceptual explanation. This cannot 
be the notion of explanation invoked by the supervenience 
argument. After all, adopting the metaphysical attitude of 
non-naturalism does not make it impossible for a philoso-
pher to find analytical explanations for conceptual truths—
any more than being a moral naturalist makes it easier for 
a philosopher to explain conceptual facts. Thus, the ability 
of finding explanations for SS, in this sense of explanation, 
namely, conceptual explanations, cannot be the test that 
should reveal the superiority of forms of naturalist realism 
vis-à-vis non-naturalism. What then is the sense of explana-
tion in which, according to the supervenience argument, the 
non-naturalist cannot, while the naturalist can, explain the 
relation of supervenience?
From the point of view of the supervenience argument, 
what stands in need of explanation is the necessary connec-
tion represented in SS by the inner box. This is metaphysi-
cal necessity. Putting the pieces together: SS is a conceptual 
truth about a metaphysical necessity. And the challenge is to 
say whence comes the metaphysical link between the super-
venient moral property F and the subvenient natural proper-
ty G. If it is true that the natural property G necessitates the 
moral property F, what grounds this necessitation? What ac-
counts for the strong metaphysical determination of the mor-
al world by the natural world? This is the operative question 
in the supervenience argument.
Now, it seems that Dreier makes two assumptions here, 
both of which can be questioned. The first assumption is that 
it makes sense to look for a genuine explanation of the meta-
physical fact of necessitation expressed inside SS. The second 
assumption says that there is no reason to doubt that the nat-
uralist is able to deliver such an explanation.
Let us ask: What is so crazy in the “fundamentalist” re-
ply to the effect that the necessitation of Fs by Gs is a brute 
metaphysical fact, a very basic feature of the universe, which 
in the end can only be registered, but not explained? Expla-
nations must come to an end somewhere. And why not here? 
Dreier does not consider this fundamentalist move. Admit-
tedly, in the context of the present debate it may look a bit 
unsatisfactory, perhaps arbitrary in a sense. But it is certainly 
not obviously ad hoc, as it is a general fact that many meta-
physical necessities have no explanations in any substantial 
sense. Think of He erus being Phosphorus or heat being 
molecular motion.
However, even if the fundamentalist move proposed 
on behalf of non-naturalists proves in the end to be arbi-
trary, it remains to be seen whether the putative explana-
tions proposed by moral naturalists avoid a similar arbitrari-
ness. Take, for instance, the explanation of the necessitation 
fact offered by the analytic naturalist who claims that the 
moral chara erization of an object follows strictly, pace 
Moore’s open question argument, from its natural descrip-
tion along with the meaning of moral terms (cf. Jackson, 1998, 
chapter 5). Then it is absolutely impossible that a difference 
in the moral facts goes unaccompanied by a difference in 
the natural facts in all possible worlds, exactly as SS claims. 
This means that the “metaphysical glue” between the natu-
ral and the moral is ultimately accounted for by an analyti-
cal glue, which is expressed by meaning identities eventually 
involving Ramseyification and other very complex devices. 
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The explanation would end here, in facts about the meaning 
of moral words. Isn’t it “arbitrary”, in a certain sense, that we 
must stop here, that we cannot ask for the grounds of the 
facts about meaning?
I take it that Dreier thinks this is not necessarily so. He 
even admits, towards the end of Dreier (n.d.), that “there may 
be no true explanation” of the metaphysical necessitation of 
moral properties. Most of the time, however, he assumes (i) 
that such an explanation is needed. (And he argues that the 
non-naturalist cannot deliver the needed explanation.) Fur-
ther, he assumes (ii) that there is no unsurmountable obstacle 
for the naturalist who is trying to give a genuine, non-arbi-
trary explanation of the facts of supervenience.
Before considering what Dreier has to say e ecially 
about the second assumption, I will comment on his grounds 
for believing that SS is true.
III
There are, of course, alternative formulations of the 
supervenience relation. Both Blackburn and Richard Hare 
(1952), for instance, thought that the form of supervenience 
that is relevant for the metaphysics of morality is Weak Su-
pervenience. This is what you get from SS by simply deleting 
the second box, thus making the link between the moral and 
the descriptive properties contingent or, in other words, by 
substituting mere determination for necessitation:
WS: ‪
a
(∀F in α)(∀x)[Fx → (∃G in β)[Gx & (∀y)[Gy → 
Fy]]]
Dreier (n.d.) discusses the adequacy of WS under the 
heading “Moral Contingency.” He finally rejects the idea 
that WS captures the most distinctive claim of moral real-
ism. If WS were all that can be said about the relation be-
tween moral facts and natural facts, moral realism would 
entail a very counterintuitive form of the moral luck thesis: 
there would be possible worlds in which torturing innocent 
people just for fun is morally right. Of course, SS entails 
WS, but not vice versa. Since Dreier takes SS to be true, he 
also takes WS to be true. What he rejects is that we can 
formally capture moral realism’s full range of claims without 
an inner necessity operator. Dreier is right here. Even radi-
cal non-naturalistic versions of moral realism (for instance, 
Moore’s version) require more than the contingent determi-
nation of the moral by the natural.
There is at least another formulation of strong superve-
nience, which Dreier quickly considers and also rightly dis-
misses, namely, Analytical Supervenience:
AS: ‪
a
(∀F in α)(∀x)[Fx → (∃G in β)[Gx & ‪
a
(∀y)[Gy 
→ Fy]]]
This interprets both modalities involved in the relation 
of supervenience as cases of conceptual or analytical necessity. 
Plausibly, the fact that the instantiation of a moral property 
must be accompanied by the instantiation of a natural prop-
erty is explained by the constitutive features of our concept 
of a moral property and its relations to the concept of natural 
properties. This means that the outer modality is analytical 
or conceptual. But it is in this sense even more plausible that 
the necessary determination of the moral by the natural, as 
encoded by the inner necessity operator, concerns the very 
nature of the corresponding properties themselves, not the 
concepts referring to them. If this is so, the inner box cannot 
express analytical necessity and AS must be rejected.
The argument dealing with WS shows that the superve-
nience relation between moral properties and natural prop-
erties is doubly modal, whereas the argument whose target 
is AS reveals that the necessity encoded inside the superve-
nience formula is metaphysical. The conclusion, as Dreier 
repeatedly asserts, can only be: “SS is true.”
From the viewpoint of robust realists, these arguments 
are convincing. Thus, robust realists can be rightly viewed as 
committed to the truth of SS. It should be noticed that these 
arguments are completely silent on the issue of the Boolean 
closure condition which Dreier closely associates with the no-
tion of strong supervenience. So far at least the robust realists’ 
commitment to the obtaining of a strong supervenience re-
lation between the moral and the natural cannot be extend-
ed to the thesis that each of the sets of moral properties and 
natural properties is closed under Boolean operations. The 
significance of this point will emerge presently.
IV
Turn now to the reason why robust realism falls prey to 
the supervenience argument. The decisive passage in Dreier 
(n.d.) reads thus:
But according to Robust Realism, the mor-
al properties are fully distinct, and distinct 
in kind, from the non-moral ones. (That is 
why we confidently speak of the ‘non-moral 
properties’.) So, Robust Realists cannot ex-
plain the necessary connection by the usual 
expedients of analysis, reduction, or identi-
ty. How, then, are they supposed to explain 
the necessary connection? They cannot. 
They have no explanation.
Dreier seems here to infer from the principled un-
availability of explanations by way of analysis, reduction, or 
identity outside the context of naturalism that robust realists 
have no explanation for the relevant necessary connection. 
Presumably, he wants to say that analysis, reduction or iden-
tity are the only possible modes of explanation here. These 
are indeed incompatible with the robust realists’ assumption 
of disjointness of the natural (the non-moral!) and the moral 
domains. But who is to say that there may not be an explana-
tion that does not proceed by way of analysis, reduction or 
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identity? It is anyway simply wrong to infer from the fact that 
robust realists cannot take recourse to “the usual expedients 
of analysis, reduction, or identity” that they cannot explain the 
necessary connection of the natural to the moral.
This is admittedly a minor point in the critical evalua-
tion of Dreier’s position. A more important point is as follows. 
When applicable, the usual expedients of analysis, reduction, 
or identity do show that the relevant sets of properties are 
not distinct in kind. They vindicate reductionism in ethics by 
entailing the thesis that the set of moral properties is in fact 
a subset of the set of natural properties. Moreover, if moral 
properties are (identical to) natural properties, then the ex-
planation of the necessary link between the moral and the 
natural follows automatically: the moral strongly supervenes 
on the natural because the moral is included in the natural. 
It could then seem that SS (together with the usual expedi-
ents of analysis, reduction, or identity) is sufficient for the fal-
sity of robust realism. But this is not so. Beyond SS (and the 
usual expedients of analysis, reduction, or identity), the nat-
uralistic explanation of supervenience also requires at least 
the assumption of the Boolean closure of natural properties, 
which, so far as we could see, is independent from SS.
What follows from SS alone is a claim to the effect that 
any moral property F is coextensive to a huge (as Jackson, for 
instance, recognizes: infinite) disjunction of natural proper-
ties G
i
, each of which is sufficient, in each possible situation, 
for the instantiation of the multiply realizable property F. To 
get a naturalistic reduction out of this, one needs to assume (i) 
that the huge disjunctive combination of natural properties 
G
i
 is itself a natural property and (ii) that necessarily coexten-
sive properties are identical. The first assumption is a case of 
the general Boolean closure clause which Dreier is willing to 
build into his chara erization of strong supervenience.
Both assumptions have been vehemently discussed in 
the relevant literature (for instance, in Van Cleve, 1990 and 
Parfit, 2011, p. 296f.). Whether or not they can be ultimately 
justified is not important for the present purposes. The cru-
cial point is that the commitment to the truth of SS without 
the Boolean closure is not sufficient to show that naturalism is 
better placed than robust realism when it comes to explaining 
the facts of supervenience.
The outcome is that we can follow Dreier in construing 
the supervenience argument as challenging the moral realist 
to explain the necessary connection that is part of SS. We can 
also agree with Dreier, at least for the sake of the argument, 
that the robust realist fares badly at trying to meet the chal-
lenge. However, we have seen that naturalistic explanations 
by the usual expedients of analysis, reduction, or identity 
are committed to claims that are not entailed by, and go far 
beyond the content of, SS. By relying on these problematic 
claims, naturalism’s approach to the necessitation of the moral 
by the natural—maybe better: usual naturalistic explanations 
of the necessary connection—cannot claim a clear advantage 
over robust realism with regard to the challenge posed by the 
supervenience argument.
V
How could a defender of moral irrealism react to the 
supervenience argument? To which form of supervenience 
are moral irrealists committed? None of the above  eci-
fied forms (SS, WS, AS), as all of them quantify over (and 
are therefore committed to) moral properties, which are 
inexistent to the eyes of the irrealist. We can still take SS 
as a starting point and remedy this by replacing all normal 
second-order quantifiers with substitutional quantifiers. α is 
now the set of moral predicates and β is the set of natural, 
uncontroversially descriptive predicates.
This means that the form of supervenience that the ir-
realist can be challenged to explain turns out to be a doubly 
modal, asymmetric dependence relation between the vocab-
ularies. What remains to be chara erized (and explained) by 
the irrealist is the sort of necessary connection represented in 
IS (the substitutional modification of SS) by the inner box:
IS: ‪
a
(∀F in α)(∀x)[Fx → (∃G in β)[Gx & ‪
p
(∀y)[Gy 
→ Fy]]]
 (All second-order quantifiers are substitutional.) 
Here we can profitably draw on a distinction proposed 
by James Klagge (1988), namely the distinction between “as-
criptive” and “ontological” supervenience. The latter is a real 
relation between worldly (sets of) properties. The former 
is some sort of order we impose on moral discourse with a 
certain purpose. According to the ascriptive view of superve-
nience, F-judgments are necessarily tied to, and supervene on, 
G-judgments, but this is not backed by underlying relations in the 
objective world. Rather, the “metaphysical glue” so cherished by 
the realist makes place here for a pragmatic link. If moral dis-
course should guide us effectively, then we cannot allow that 
morally different ways of chara erizing things go with iden-
tity of the underlying natural descriptions. In other words, we 
are pragmatically coerced to re ect strong supervenience, on 
pain of nullifying the pra ical point of moralizing talk. 
This is, in extremely compressed form, the distinctive 
claim of moral expressivism paradigmatically associated with 
Blackburn. It may have all sorts of problems, which cannot be 
addressed here. My contention is only that it passes the test of 
the supervenience argument, provided IS is substituted for SS.
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